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Monday February 9, 2026
Good morning. The negotiations will continue. Lawyer Ryssdal will proceed, but first, lawyer Gabrielsen will briefly address the court.
A new document has just been submitted. The court asks whether there is agreement between the parties regarding its presentation.
Lawyer Gabrielsen explains that two new documents have been submitted:
“I have submitted a new document and or strictly two new documents. And first of all, there is agreement between the parties regarding the presentation. This is because the state understood Jehovah’s Witnesses in such a way that this word “shun” was not used in Jehovah’s Witnesses’ texts and was derogatory. And the state has wanted to present something that sheds light on that. A text where that word is used. And it is a bit unclear to the state whether consent is actually required here. And it’s somewhat related to the fact that this text or this particular printout of the website that I have presented, it is directly linked to a video that was presented and played in both the district court and the court of appeal. So in that sense, the document doesn’t really provide any particularly new information in the case, but it is in a way a kind of, what should I say, a small page that refers to that video with that title in English. If it requires consent then I’ll see the state about it. According to Section 307 of the Tisteloven. This text is one of Jehovah’s Witnesses own texts. It falls well within the questions addressed in the case. There is no major new evidence. And then I just remind the court that I am certainly fully aware that once the appeal hearing has begun, the decision-making authority lies with the trial court. And as I said, this is what Joas Sitner is informed about and has consented to under the condition that the Norwegian translation of his post is also included. Thanks.
The court thanks Gabrielsen and gives the floor to lawyer Ryssdal.
Lawyer Ryssdal’s submission
Lawyer Ryssdal addresses the Supreme Court judges. He notes, somewhat humorously, that his client remarked that he has spoken too much about the term translated as “avoid.” The English verb in question is neutral in meaning and not particularly burdensome when viewed in isolation. While Jehovah’s Witnesses no longer use this term, it has appeared in their publications over the years, including the one presented by the state. Ryssdal emphasizes that this expression is very far removed from the concept of “shunning” as used by the state. Jehovah’s Witnesses do not use the term “shunning.”
Referring to the First Letter to the Corinthians, he notes that the expression used there concerns “not associating.” In the Norwegian version of the document presented by the state, this distinction is clear. While the English text uses the verb “avoid,” the Norwegian translation speaks of avoiding contact and refraining from association. This clarification, he argues, is useful to establish early on and is not central to his broader submission.
Ryssdal then returns to his outline, noting that he had reached page 29 of 62, where he was discussing whether the practices in question could pose problems for children or minors. The focus is largely on young people aged 16–17 who may be baptized and who, at some future point, could theoretically be disfellowshipped.
He stresses that the issue of minors in Jehovah’s Witnesses has been addressed in other judgments, particularly in cases from Russia, where the state argued that membership was harmful to children and could lead to family conflicts. Ryssdal turns to an excerpt from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), reading from the Moscow judgment. The ECHR found that domestic courts had not substantiated claims of widespread family conflict. Only a few isolated instances were identified, and no statistical comparison had been conducted to demonstrate that Jehovah’s Witness families experienced more breakdowns than others.
Ryssdal concludes that neither the Russian cases nor the present case contain material indicating widespread family conflict or harmful upbringing.
Witness testimony on family life and upbringing
Ryssdal refers to testimony from several witnesses. One witness, Dåland, described her experience as a mother and a Jehovah’s Witness. She testified that the Bible was a central part of her upbringing and that it made her a better mother. Her children had friends at school and maintained contact with non-Witness relatives, including grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Gift-giving on birthdays or Christmas by non-Witness relatives was permitted. Maintaining close relationships with extended family was important to the parents and beneficial for the children.
Ryssdal emphasizes that this reflects a normal Norwegian family life: strong religious commitment alongside normal social interaction with family, school, and friends outside the faith.
Regarding baptism, he notes that if a person under 18 seeks baptism, parents are involved. Parents are generally best placed to assess whether a child is mature enough. One witness explained that none of her children had yet chosen baptism and that they were free to decide at their own pace, secure in the knowledge that their parents’ love was unconditional.
Ryssdal stresses that Jehovah’s Witnesses do not pressure children into a religious framework against their will.
He then refers to witness Stangeland, who grew up in a mixed-faith household where her mother was a Witness and her father was not religious. She testified that becoming a Jehovah’s Witness was her own personal choice, made when she felt ready and understood its meaning. There was no fixed age requirement.
Another witness, Stenhaug, was born and raised as a Jehovah’s Witness. Although she was the only sibling to be baptized, her siblings were not, and this had no adverse consequences. She maintained contact with her parents throughout, even though religion was not a frequent topic of discussion.
Ryssdal also discusses witness Haugan, whose daughter was disfellowshipped at age 18 while still living at home. Haugan testified that although religious activities together ceased, family relationships remained intact. The daughter later moved to Oslo for school, and the family continued to support her emotionally and practically, maintaining regular contact.
Ryssdal highlights that these accounts demonstrate ordinary family dynamics rather than estrangement or psychological harm.
Mental health research
Ryssdal turns to quantitative studies on mental health among Jehovah’s Witnesses. He refers to a researcher, Furu Liber, who conducted extensive sociological research involving approximately 15,000 participants across 15 countries. Contrary to claims that Jehovah’s Witnesses suffer worse mental health outcomes, the study concluded that they experienced fewer mental health problems than the general population. While strict religious requirements can pose challenges, faith, social support, and a coherent worldview can also be protective factors.
He also refers to a large Japanese study involving around 7,000 participants. The results showed minimal fear of rejection or ostracism among Jehovah’s Witnesses. Most participants rated their physical and mental health as satisfactory or better, reported healthy lifestyle habits, and demonstrated a positive outlook on life.
Ryssdal contrasts these findings with small studies cited by the state that focus on individuals who have left Jehovah’s Witnesses, arguing that such samples are not representative.
Expert testimony and assessment of former members’ accounts
Ryssdal references expert witness Professor Bessier, who has written extensively on Jehovah’s Witnesses. Bessier cautions against uncritical reliance on accounts from former members, noting that memory is malleable and that people often reinterpret their past experiences in light of later decisions.
Ryssdal summarizes that Jehovah’s Witnesses do not practice infant baptism. Whether one is born into the faith or joins later, baptism requires education, training, and an understanding of its implications, including the possibility of social distancing if one later leaves. Parents and elders must vouch for the maturity of minors. Many young people choose not to be baptized, and this decision carries no negative consequences.
He argues that while social distancing may be experienced as unpleasant, particularly by adolescents, it does not amount to psychological violence. It is not characterized by aggression or coercive exercise of power and is comparable to changes in social relationships that commonly occur throughout life.
Negative social control and legal analysis
Ryssdal then addresses the concept of “negative social control.” He argues that it is not a legally defined or predictable concept and is not used in the Religious Communities Act. Preparatory works mention it only in passing, often in connection with serious abuses such as forced marriage or genital mutilation.
He refers to the Norwegian Official Report (NOU) 2024:13, which examined whether negative social control should be criminalized. The committee concluded that the concept is difficult to define, highly context-dependent, and unsuitable for inclusion in the Criminal Code. Criminalizing it would risk disproportionate interference with parental responsibility and ordinary upbringing.
The committee emphasized that there must be room for parents to exercise legitimate authority and care. Accordingly, it recommended against incorporating negative social control as a legal basis for criminal liability.
Ryssdal argues that if the legislature had intended negative social control to be grounds for denying state benefits to religious communities, this would have been explicitly debated and codified in law. It cannot be inferred indirectly from preparatory materials without violating the principle of legality.
He also refers to ECHR case law emphasizing the need for clear and foreseeable legal rules when restricting religious freedom.
Conclusion
Ryssdal concludes that negative social control is not a legal concept that can justify interference with religious freedom. It lacks legal basis and predictability. He recalls ECHR jurisprudence recognizing that many religions impose doctrinal standards governing private conduct, which the state may not regulate.
He maintains that Jehovah’s Witnesses neither practice nor are subject to negative social control or psychological violence. The evidence shows normal family relationships, social integration, and no elevated psychological harm among minors or adults.
Accordingly, the state has failed to substantiate its claims, and interference with the religious freedom of Jehovah’s Witnesses would be unjustified.